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Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith:
Does the Constitutionally Compelled Free
Exercise Exemption Have a Prayer?
The free exercise clause of the first amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the free exercise" of
religion.' This guarantee of religious freedom encompasses both the
freedom to believe and the freedom to act in pursuit of those
beliefs.' The free exercise clause absolutely protects any religious
belief? However, when a statute with a secular purpose burdens
religious conduct or compels action prohibited by a particular
religion, the constitutional protection of the religious conduct is less
definite.4
The Supreme Court of the United States has struggled in
developing a test to determine when the free exercise clause is
violated by a statute which burdens or compels religious conduct.5
As a result, free exercise jurisprudence is confusing.6 In general, an
individual who alleges a violation of the free exercise clause seeks
a legal excuse from obeying a law which burdens the individual's
religion.7 This "excuse" is often termed a constitutionally
1. The text of the first amendment pertaining to religion reads: 'Congress shall make no law
respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... U.S. CONsT.
amend. I.
2. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940).
3. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879).
4. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 305.
5. See infra notes 29-108 and accompanying text (discussing instances where the Court has
struggled when interpreting the free exercise clause).
6. See Note, Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion: A Subjective Alternative, 102 HARV.
L. REv. 1258,1258 (1989) (characterizing the free exercise jurisprudence as "a series of unsuccessful
line-drawing experiments to determine when frst amendment protection should rescue an individual
from intrusive governmental activities").
7. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (individual seeking an excuse from
compulsory school attendance law); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (individual
seeking an excuse from polygamy prohibition).
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compelled free exercise exemption.' Commonly, free exercise
cases involve granting an excuse from obeying a law which is
neutral on its face and uniformly applied to all religions.9 While
a law may be facially neutral, its application may burden a
particular individual's religious practices." Traditionally, the
Court has reviewed the constitutionality of these statutes under a
standard of "strict scrutiny.""1 Strict scrutiny requires a state to
show that the burden on the individual's practice of religion is the
least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest."
When an individual seeks a free exercise exemption from a
neutral and otherwise valid law, the court is presented with a
number of conflicting issues. One such issue concerns the tension
between the free exercise clause and the establishment clause of the
first amendment. 3 This tension arises because an exemption from
a law under the free exercise clause may amount to the preferential
treatment of a particular religion in violation of the establishment
clause requirement that religions be treated neutrally. 4 Another
8. See generally Marshall, The Case Against The Constitutionally Compelled Free Erercise
Exemption, 40 CASF. W. REs. 357 (1990) (criticizing the constitutionally compelled free exercise
exemption).
9. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1600 (1990) (denoting a neutral law as
one of "general applicability").
10. See id. at 1608 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that while most of the Court's free
exercise cases have involved generally applicable laws, those laws which directly regulate religion
would also implicate first amendment protection). For an example of a unique instance where religion
is directly regulated, see McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (invalidating a state law which
prohibited ministers and priests from acting as delegates to Tennessee's constitutional convention).
11. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (seminal case adopting the strict scrutiny standard
of review to determine whether the free exercise clause compels a religious exemption).
12. See id. at 403-09 (discussing the requirements of strict scrutiny); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205,225 (1972) (stating that the free exercise clause required that the laws with compelling state
interests allow exemptions for religious practices that do not "'jeopardize" the interest); Smith, 110
S. Ct. at 1604 n.3 (comparing the application of strict scrutiny to statutes in free exercise claims with
its application in other constitutional areas, such as equal protection and free speech cases).
13. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... S . . CONsT.
amend I.
14. See Marshall, supra note 8, at 358 (arguing that problems arise when the free exercise
clause calls for an exemption favoring a particular religion because the establishment clause
simultaneously prohibits special deference to any religions). But see Developments in the Law-
Religion and the State, 100 HARv. L REv. 1606, 1705 (1987) (disagreeing with Professor Marshall's
theory that allowing an exemption violates the establishment clause by asserting that disallowing an
exemption to a religious objector may transgress the establishment provision). For an example of the
conflict see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that a South Carolina statute which
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problem arising in the context of a free exercise exemption is the
court's assessment of the sincerity of both the religion and the
individual's belief in the religion. 5 While the court is prevented
from determining the truth or falsity of religious belief, the court
must evaluate the honesty of the individual's belief in order to
ensure that the individual is not using their alleged religion to
shield misconduct. 6 A further concern surrounding the grant of
a free exercise exemption is that religious opportunists will
frequently seek exemption from many laws and subvert the intent
of free exercise clause protection.' 7 Since every statute could
feasibly burden an individual's religious practice, the government
would be forced to justify each law with a compelling state interest
under the strict scrutiny standard of review in order to be enforce
the law's provisions." Such a burden on the exercise of law could
severely limit the government's power.1 9
required the plaintiff to work on Saturday in order to be eligible for unemployment compensation
benefits violated the free exercise clause). But see Thorton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985)
(holding that a state statute that required employers to grant their employees their religious day of
rest off of work violated the establishment clause).
15. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (asserting that determining the
constitutional significance of religious belief or conduct is a "'most delicate question"). Cf. Smith,
110 S. Ct. at 1604 (discussing the problem of using "centrality" of an individual's religion as a
trigger for the application of strict scrutiny as one which again presents the impossible problem of
assessing the nature of the religious belief or conduct).
16. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (holding that the first amendment
precluded consideration of the truth of the merits of an individual's religious beliefs); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding that a statute which required a state official to determine
whether a solicitor's motivation was religious violated the fist amendment). In Smith, however, the
sincerity of the religious belief of the claimant is not disputed. Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S.
660, 667 (1988).
17. See Lupa, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion,
102 HARv. L. REV. 933, 947 (1989) (expressing the fear of the judiciary that -b]ehind every free
exercise claim is a spectral march; grant this one, a voice whispers to each judge, and you will be
confronted with an endless chain of exemption demands from religious deviants of every stripe").
18. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 707 n.17 (1986); Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 1603 (asserting
that the result of the application of strict scrutiny to all statutes that burden an individual's religious
practice make the laws of the state contingent on their coincidence with the individual's religious
beliefs).
19. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1605. In fact, Justice Scalia went so far as to state that a society
which was forced to justify each law burdening a religious practice would be "courting anarchy."
Id.
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The Court encountered these issues in Employment Division v.
Smith.20 In Smith, the Supreme Court held that unless a statute is
intended to target a particular religious practice, the free exercise
clause does not prohibit the application of a neutral criminal
statute, regardless of the burden imposed on the individual's
religion.21 By refusing to apply strict scrutiny, the Court virtually
denied the availability of a constitutionally compelled free exercise
exemption from a neutral law because of apprehension that the
government will be forced to justify every claim of religious
burden.22 In so holding, the majority appeared concerned that
accommodating nontraditional religions would cause the
fragmentation of our society.' As a practical result, challenges to
laws restricting religious freedoms have little chance of success. 24
Part I of this Note reviews the troubled evolution of the
constitutional free exercise jurisprudenceY Part II examines the
facts and analysis of the Supreme Court opinion in Smith.26 Part
Ill assesses the implications of the Court's holding in Smith on
prior case law, as well as the potential effect on other religious
practices. 7 Lastly, Part IV presents the legal implications of the
Smith decision on religious freedom in California.28
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has distinguished between the
constitutional protection of religious beliefs and the protection of
religious practices.29 The protection of religious belief is
20. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
21. Id. at 1606. The criminal statute in Smith would be considered a neutral law because it
was generally applied to all individuals of every religion. Id. at 1599.
22. Id. at 1603. See Marshall, supra note 8, at 371 (noting that after Smith, there is a
substantial doubt that an exemption under the free exercise clause exists).
23. Smith, 110 S. CL at 1605.
24. See infra notes 178-201 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's restriction of
religious freedom in Smith).
25. See infra notes 29-108 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 109-177 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 178-220 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 221-240 and accompanying text.
29. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879).
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absolute.3" However, religious practices were only minimally
protected. So long as the purpose of the statute was secular, the
Court did not find a violation of the free exercise clause where a
statute regulated religious practices."
A. The Belief/Practice Distinction
The first Supreme Court decision involving the free exercise
clause was Reynolds v. United States.32 In Reynolds, the plaintiff,
George Reynolds, sought an exemption from a federal law
prohibiting the practice of polygamy in the United States
Territories.33 Reynolds argued that as a member of the Mormon
church it was his duty to practice polygamy." Holding that
Reynolds was not allowed an exemption from the law to practice
polygamy, even though it was his religious belief, the Court
distinguished the degree of free exercise protection afforded
religious beliefs from the protection of religious practices.35 The
Court decided that religious beliefs and convictions enjoy absolute
protection, but religious practices required only qualified
protection.36 The Court stated that limiting the protection of
religious practices was necessary because granting an exemption
for religious practices would render the state laws inferior to the
religious beliefs which motivated the practices of the individual.37
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
33. Id. at 161.
34. Id. at 146, 161.
35. Id. at 167. The Court relied heavily on Thomas Jefferson's response to the Danbury
Baptist Association in establishing the distinction between the free exercise protection of belief and
conduct: "'Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God;
that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship; that the legislative powers of
government reach actions only, and not opinions .... .- Id. at 164.
36. Id. at 166. The Court discussed a hypothetical of a wife who believed it was her religious
duty to sacrifice herself by burning with her dead husband on his funeral pyre as illustrating the
classic problem with finding that one cannot criminalize practices stemming from religious beliefs.
Id.
37. Id. at 167. For an example where a statute regulating religious practices was upheld, see
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that a statute which prohibited children from
selling literature in public was not a violation of the free exercise clause even though both the
1419
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 22
In Cantwell v. Connecticut,38 the Court applied the first
amendment free exercise clause to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.39 Newton Cantwell and his two sons, all Jehovah's
Witnesses, were arrested for soliciting contributions to religious
publications.' This practice violated a state statute requiring all
solicitors to receive permission from an official authorized to
ascertain whether the solicitor's motive was religious.4' The Court
concluded that leaving the power to determine the sincerity of a
religious solicitor to the discretion of -a state official was a restraint
on the freedom of religious belief and a violation of the first
amendment free exercise protection through the fourteenth
amendment.42
The Court in Braunfeld v. Brown43 maintained the difference
between free exercise clause protection of belief and practices
developed in Reynolds." The appellants, orthodox Jews, were
required by their faith to close their businesses from Friday at
sundown to Saturday at sundown in order to observe their
Sabbath.45 However, a Pennsylvania criminal statute prohibited
business activity on Sunday in order to provide a uniform day of
rest.46 Thus, appellants lost two days of business, whereas others
who did not observe the Saturday Sabbath only lost one.47 The
Court rejected the appellants' claim that the statute violated the free
exercise of their religion because the Court determined that only
guardian and child were acting in accord with their religious beliefs, since the right to religious
practices did not include the right to expose the child to ill health or death).
38. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
39. Id. at 303.
40. Id. at 300.
41. Id. at 301-02.
42. id. at 303-05. The court stated that while the "fourteenth amendment embraces the
freedom to believe and the freedom to act ... [t]he freedom to believe is absolute and the freedom
to act is not.' Id. Although the analysis in CanrweU relied on the free exercise clause, the Court did
note other constitutional implications involving free speech and freedom of the press. Id. at 300.
43. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
44. Id. at 603.
45. Id. at 601.
46. Id. Although the statute was criminal, the purpose of the statute, providing a uniform day
of rest for employees, was secular. Id.
47. Id.
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direct regulation of religious practices was unconstitutional.48
According to the Court, the statute acted only as an indirect
burden, making the practice of religion more expensive, and thus
the statute was not prohibited by the free exercise clause.
49
B. The Accommodation Approach
Beginning in the 1960's with Sherbert v. Verner,5" the Court
began to subject laws burdening religious practices to increased
judicial review by applying strict scrutiny. The Court applied the
strict scrutiny standard developed in Sherbert to statutes which
unintentionally restricted religious practices even where the purpose
of the statute was secular and the burden indirect. The Court's use
of strict scrutiny resulted in more protection for religious practices
because the state was required to exempt individuals from
compliance where uniform application of the law would not affect
a compelling state interest."1
In Sherbert v. Verner, appellant Idele Sherbert was a member
of the Seventh-Day Adventist faith that observes Saturday as a day
of rest.5" Sherbert was fired from her job because she refused to
work on Saturday.53 As a result, she was denied unemployment
compensation benefits because her refusal to work constituted
48. Id. at 603.
49. Id. The court maintained the belief/practice distinction by finding that overt acts compelled
by religious convictions were not free from legislative restrictions, and thus received only qualified
constitutional protection. Id. However, Justice Stewart, in dissent, felt that the law compelled
appellants to choose between their religious belief and financial solvency, and was therefore
unconstitutional. Id. at 616 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
50. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
51. See The Supreme Cour4 1987 Term-Leading Cases, 102 ARv. L. REv. 143,238 (1988)
(listing the criticisms of the accommodation approach as high administrative costs and increased risk
of inconsistent results due to the malleable nature of the competing interests). See also Developments
in the Law-Religion and the State, supra note 14, at 1704 n.3 (defining religious accornmodation
as "any state attempt to facilitate religious belief or protect religious practice").
52. 374 U.S. at 399.
53. Id.
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"good cause" to terminate under the applicable unemployment
compensation statute.54
The Sherbert Court adopted the standard of strict scrutiny to
determine whether an individual must be granted an exemption
from a state law on the basis of free exercise protection.5 Under
the strict scrutiny standard, the individual must initially prove that
the state law in question imposes a significant burden on the
individual's free exercise of religion.56 Once this has been
established, the burden shifts to the state to show that a compelling
state interest is furthered through uniform enforcement of the law,
without allowing for any religious exemption.57 The law must also
represent the least restrictive means of promoting the compelling
state interest.5
The Court found that Sherbert had demonstrated a significant
burden even though the effect on her first amendment rights was
indirect.59 Reasoning that the law forced Sherbert to choose
between observing the tenets of her religion or receiving
unemployment benefits, the Court determined the state had imposed
a penalty upon Sherbert for her Saturday worship.' The Court
stated that although the state had not compelled the appellant to
work a six-day work week through criminal sanctions, this was not
the end of the analysis.61 This implies that criminal sanctions
would be granted more judicial scrutiny than a law conditioning
state benefits.
With respect to the state's burden, the Court found that the
state's interest in protecting the financial integrity of the
unemployment benefit fund from depletion by undeserving
54. Id. at 400-01. The "good cause" standard created a standard for exemptions under the
unemployment compensation system because if the employee was terminated without "good cause,"
the employee would be eligible for unemployment benefits. Id.
55. Id. at 403-09.
56. Id. at 403.
57. Id. at 403-09.
58. Id. at 407.
59. Id. at 404. Thus, the Court rejected the distinction developed in Braunfeld that an indirect
burden could not violate the free exercise clause.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 403-04.
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employees was neither compelling nor the least restrictive
alternative.62 The Court found that the mere possibility of
fraudulent claims was not a compelling state interest.63
Furthermore, the Court emphasized that a "good cause" standard
for exemptions under the unemployment compensation scheme was
conducive to allowing exemptions for religiously motivated
misconduct.'
Thus, in Sherbert, the Court moved towards accommodating
more religious practices by adopting the standard of strict
scrutiny. 5 This standard of review results in more accommodation
than the Court's approach in Reynolds, because the states are
forced to justify statutes burdening religious practices by proving
the existence of a compelling state interest that cannot be as
completely achieved without denying the exemption. In contrast,
under Reynolds, the Court would have found most of these statutes
did not constitutionally compel an exemption because of the limited
protection given religious practices.'
Sherbert was reaffirmed in Wisconsin v. Yoder.67 Jonas Yoder,
a member of the Old Order Amish religion, was convicted of
violating a compulsory high school attendance law that required
him to place his children in public or private school until they
62. Id. at 403-07. The Court declared that the state had presented no proof to justify the
substantial burden on Sherbert's religious freedom. Id. at 408. The state had also not demonstrated
that less restrictive alternative forms of regulation were unavailable. Id. at 407.
63. Id. at 408.
64. Id. at 401-02 n.4. The Court reasoned that since the unemployment compensation
regulations contained a mechanism for individualized exemptions under the "'good cause" standard,
the refusal by the state to extend this mechanism to individuals with burdens on their religion implied
an intent to discriminate. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (discussing the "'good cause" standard
in Sherbert).
65. 374 U.S. 398, 406.
66. See supra notes 32-49 and accompanying text (discussing the belief/practice distinction).
67. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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reached age sixteen.6" Yoder claimed that the statute interfered
with the traditional Amish objection to formal education."9
The Yoder Court recognized that states have the power to
regulate education, but that their power is defined by the strict
scrutiny standard.70 The Court found that the statute substantially
burdened an over 300 year old Amish objection to formal
education by imposing criminal penalties if Yoder did not comply,
thus satisfying the initial requirement of strict scrutiny.71 Turning
to the state's burden, the Court reasoned that even the state interest
in regulating education, which ranked at the "very apex of the
function of a state ' 72 was not sufficiently compelling to justify
the significant burden on Yoder's religious freedom.73 Therefore,
because the application of this neutral law unduly burdened the free
exercise of religion, the Court held that the first and fourteenth
amendments prohibited the state from compelling the Amish family
to send their children to public school.74
In Thomas v. Review Board,75 the Court considered the case
of a Jehovah's Witness who voluntarily quit a job manufacturing
weapons due to his religious belief in peace, and was thereafter
denied unemployment benefits. 6 When applying strict scrutiny,
the Court found that, as determined in Sherbert, requiring an
individual to choose between receiving unemployment benefits and
acting in accord with their religious beliefs constituted a significant
burden on the individual.' Likewise, the Court found that the
68. Id. at 207-08. The Wisconsin statute specified that violators of the statute could "be fined
not less than $5 nor more than $50 or imprisoned not more than 3 months or both." Id. at 208 n.2.
Therefore, Yoder involved the application of strict scrutiny to a criminal statute. See infra notes 141-
153 and accompanying text (asserting that the strict scrutiny standard has never been applied to
compel an exemption to a criminal statute).
69. Id at 210.
70. Id. at 214.
71. Id. at 218. A criminal sanction may be said to impose a significant burden.
72. Id. at 213.
73. Id. at 214-15.
74. Id. at 220, 234.
75. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
76. Id. at 710-12. The facts and application ofstrict scrutiny in Sherbertv. Verner are virtually
identical to Thomas v. Review Board.
77. Id. at 710-12.
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state's interest of avoiding widespread unemployment due to an
individual's personal religious reasons and avoiding detailed
investigation of job applicants in order to determine their religious
beliefs was not sufficiently compelling to justify the burden placed
on Thomas.7" Thus, Thomas was allowed a free exercise
exemption from the denial of his unemployment benefits. 9
C. The Compulsion Approach
Recently, the Court has begun to restrict the accommodation
approach and return to the stricter Reynolds belief/practice
distinction by finding reasons not to apply strict scrutiny when
reviewing the constitutionality of statutes. In recent cases, the Court
has focused on the "compulsion" aspect of the statute. If the
statute compelled the individual to act in a manner prohibited by
the individual's religion, the Court applied strict scrutiny. Where
the statute conditioned receipt of a benefit upon the individual's
conduct and indirectly compelled the individual, the Court refused
to apply strict scrutiny and instead required only a rational reason
to justify the burden. s Otherwise, if the Court found that no
governmental compulsion existed, as where the individual sought
to compel the government to act, the free exercise clause was not
implicated. The compulsion approach increases the difficulty of
receiving an exemption because the strict scrutiny standard is
applied less often, if at all.
78. Id. at 717-19. The Court again focused on the "good cause" standard within the
unemployment scheme relied upon by the Sherbert Court. See supra note 64 and accompanying text
(discussing the -good cause" standard).
79. Id. at 719.
80. See infra notes 88-99 and accompanying text (discussing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693
(1986)). A rational basis was required for laws which conditioned state benefits, such as the welfare
statute in Bowen. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 706. However, where such a law included a system for
individualized exemptions, such as the "good cause" standard in Sherbert, strict scrutiny would be
applied. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing the "good cause" standard).
1425
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United States v. Lee"' marked the beginning of the Court's
trend away from accommodating religious practices.82 In Lee, an
individual sought an exemption from a federal statute requiring him
to pay social security taxes."' Applying strict scrutiny, the Court
found that the statute imposed a burden on Lee's right to conduct
himself in accordance with his religious beliefs. 4 However, the
Court determined that the burden on Lee was justified by a
compelling governmental interest in maintaining the social security
system and assuring the continued payment of taxes.8 5 In this
case, to accommodate the religious objector would make the social
security system impossible to administer.8 6 The Court indicated
that accommodating religious practices could greatly inhibit the
power of the legislature, thus establishing the government's
compelling interest under the strict scrutiny standard."7
The compulsion approach was fully revealed in Bowen v.
Roy.88 Appellees Stephen Roy and Karen Miller had applied for,
but were denied welfare benefits because of their failure to obtain
a social security number for their daughter, Little Bird. 9 By
assigning a number to Little Bird, the appellees contended that,
according to their Native American religious beliefs, Little Bird's
spirit would be robbed.' ° The Court declined to apply strict
scrutiny, stating that the scope of the free exercise clause did not
81. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
82. Id. at 256-58. Although the result in this case is quite defensible, the major portion of the
Court's opinion focused on the evils of accommodation of religious practices, foreshadowing the
current restriction of religious freedom. Id.
83. Id. at 254-59. The Amish believed that it was a sin to not support their own elderly and
poor and thus opposed paying into social security on religious grounds. Id. at 255.
34. Id. at 258.
35. Id. at 258-59.
36. Id. at 256-58. The Court noted that it was impossible to differentiate between the Amish's
objection to taxes from other the other religions' objections to taxes. Id. at 260.
37. Id. at 259. The Court identified the "cosmopolitan" nature of our nation as contributing
to the difficulty with accommodating religious practices. Id. Accordingly, the Court reasoned that in
order to maintain an "organized society," many religious practices could not be exempted. Id.
88. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
89. Id. at 695.
90. Id. at 695-96.
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include a right of the individual to alter the internal procedures of
the government to suit the individual's particular religious needs.9'
Arguably, the same result would have occurred if the Court had
applied strict scrutiny in Bowen, because the state's interest in the
welfare system was just as compelling as the interest in
maintaining the integrity of the social security system in Lee.
However, the Court, in accord with the compulsion approach,
determined that since the individual was "compelling" the
government to act, and not the government "compelling" the
individual to act, the free exercise protections were not
implicated.' The Court reasoned that since the government had
such wide latitude in enforcing and regulating large federal
programs such as welfare, any religious accommodation was better
left to the legislature. 93
The Bowen Court distinguished between the free exercise clause
protection for individuals compelled to violate a religious belief by
criminal sanctions and those individuals offered state benefits
conditioned on their willingness to violate a religious belief.94
Refusing to grant an exemption to the federal statutory requirement
regardless of the existence of a compelling state interest, the Court
found that statutes conditioning receipt of state benefits only
required a showing of a mere rational interest by the state in order
to withstand a free exercise challenge.95 The Court reasoned that
the application of strict scrutiny to cases involving complex benefit
programs might lead to numerous exemptions, creating
administrative confusion.96 The Court noted that a statute
conditioning a government benefit was "less intrusive" than one
91. Id. at 699. The Court reasoned that individuals could not "dictate the conduct of the
Government's own procedures." Id.
92. Id. at 699-70.
93. Id. at 712.
94. Id. at 706.
95. Id.
96. Id. Therefore, even though Sherbert involved receipt of state benefits, a higher standard
was developed since the refusal of Sherbert to use the individualized "good cause" mechanism
within the unemployment scheme suggested a discriminatory intent if not extended to cases of
religious hardship. Id.
1427
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compelling an individual to violate their religion.97 However, if an
individual could show that the state intended to discriminate against
religion in a case involving a statute conditioning state benefits,
strict scrutiny would be applied.98 Thus, the Court seemed to
imply that strict scrutiny was still applicable to statutes which
prohibited particular religious practices, rather than those which
merely conditioned the receipt of state benefits.99
In certain types of cases involving prison or military
regulations, the Court has consistently declined to apply strict
scrutiny." °  The Court has traditionally accorded extreme
deference to the government in these cases because of the strong
state or federal interests.'O Therefore, it was not a departure from
Sherbert for the Court to decline to apply strict scrutiny in such
factually distinct situations.
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association,10 2 a Native American Indian organization alleged
that the government's plans to build a road through sacred Indian
religious land violated the free exercise clause.103 The Court
analogized to Bowen, which involved the assignment of a social
security number to the Indian child, and reasoned that the cases
97. Id. at 704.
98. Id. at 708.
99. Id. at 699.
100. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), where petitioner was an orthodox
Jew in the Air Force who alleged that his first amendment rights were violated by an Air Force
regulation forbidding him to wear his yarmulke while in uniform. Id. at 504. The Court refused to
apply strict scrutiny because the Court only requires a rational relationship, and not a compelling state
interest, when reviewing all types of military regulations. Id. at 507-10. Based on the Court's extreme
deference when reviewing military regulations, the Court held that the petitioner's free exercise rights
were not violated. Id. The Court was faced with a free exercise challenge by a prisoner in O'Lone
v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). The Islamic prisoner asserted that the application of a
prison regulation prohibited him from participating in a sacred religious ceremony, Jumu'ah, which
conflicted with the prisoner's work schedule. Id. at 345. Similarly to the military scenario, the
traditional standard of review for all prison regulations requires only that the state justify the burden
on the individual with a reasonable and legitimate state interest, instead of a compelling state interest.
Id. Therefore, the Court held that the statute was constitutional under this lowered standard of review.
Id.
101. See supra note 100 (discussing the Court's deference in these cases).
102. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
103. Id. at 442.
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were similar."°  Both involved circumstances where the
individuals sought to dictate the government's internal procedures,
as opposed to situations where the individuals were being
sanctioned for practicing their religion. 05 The Court once again
distinguished the greater protection of the individual against state
compulsion from the minimal protection offered against incidental
burdens imposed by the internal governmental procedures."°
Lyng was not a scenario implicating the protection of the free
exercise clause, even though the Court acknowledged that the
government activities would make the Indians' practice of religion
impossible. °7
Although the application of the standard of strict scrutiny has
not been specifically rejected, the Court has restricted the use of
the standard by defining free exercise claims as only those where
the government has coerced or compelled the individual by directly
ordering or intentionally inducing the individual. Strict scrutiny
continues to remain applicable to cases involving the denial of
unemployment benefits under the "good cause" standard for legal
conduct.' In cases where the individual was seeking to dictate
the internal actions of the government, the Court has found that
free exercise protection is not available, and thus strict scrutiny is
not applicable. In light of the foregoing, at the time of the Supreme
Court's review of Employment Division v. Smith, the availability of
the strict scrutiny standard in cases dissimilar to the facts in
Sherbert was dubious.
104. Id. at 447-53.
105. Id.
106. Id. Thus, if the federal government had ordered the Indians to not practice their religion
on the government's land, that action would have been reviewed under strict scrutiny because it
would have involved governmental compulsion.
107. Id. The Court determined that there was no free exercise claim, since the individuals were
not compelled or coerced to abandon their religious practices. Id. The Court stated that it did not
want to discourage the government from using its own land by accommodating the Indian's religion.
Id. at 453. See Note, The Scope of the Free Exercise Clause: Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association, 68 N.C.L. REV. 410, 421-22 (1990) (author criticizes the Lyng Court for
applying a strict line-drawing test instead of strict scrutiny, resulting in a decision which "reeks of
injustice").
108. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (discussing Thomas v. Review Board).
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II. THE CASE
A. The Factual and Procedural History
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith,"0 9 the claimants, Galen Black and Alfred Smith,
worked as counselors for a private alcohol and drug abuse
rehabilitation center."' As members of the Native American
Church, they consumed a small amount of peyote as part of a
sacramental ceremony. 1' Subsequently, both men were fired for
violating a company policy that required all counselors to abstain
from using alcohol or drugs." 2 The counselors were denied
unemployment benefits by the Employment Division of Oregon's
Department of Human Resources, on grounds that they had been
terminated for misconduct in the course of employment." 3
The claimants separately appealed to the Oregon Court of
Appeals, which determined that the cases were similar to Sherbert
and thus the claimants' religious practice of ingesting peyote was
substantially burdened by the denial of unemployment benefits.
114
The Oregon Court of Appeals concluded that the state interest in
assuring financial integrity of the unemployment compensation
system was not compelling, and the court remanded the case. S
The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision
by likewise treating the relevant state interest as the one justifying
the unemployment benefit regulation, and not the interest behind
109. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
110. Id. at 1597.
111. Id.
112. Smith v. Employment Div., 301 Or. 209, 211-12, 721 P.2d 445, 446 (1986).
113. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1598. Oregon state law denied unemployment compensation benefits
to employees fired for work-related misconduct. Id. at 1598. See OR. REV. STAT. § 657.176(2)(a)
(1989) (applicable statute). Thus, the claimants might also have been discharged if they had taken
wine during a Catholic communion service, since the employer's policy also prohibited use of
alcohol. Black v. Employment Div., 301 Or. 221, 223, 721 P.2d 451, 452 (1986).
114. Smith v. Employment Div, 75 Or. App. 764,709 P.2d 246 (1985); Black v. Employment
Div., 75 Or. App. 735, 707 P.2d 1274 (1985).
115. Black, 75 Or. App. 735, 707 P.2d 1274, 1280. The court remanded to establish three
findings: (1) Whether peyote was a sacrament of the church; (2) whether the claimants were members
of the Native American Church; and (3) whether the belief in using peyote was sincerely held. Id.
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the state statute criminalizing peyote.11 6 Therefore, the state had
to justify the burden on the claimants' religion with the state
interest in maintaining the financial integrity of the unemployment
benefit fund, and not by the state interest in public health and
safety that underlies the criminal prohibition against use of
peyote." 7 Finding, consistent with Sherbert, that the financial
integrity of the unemployment benefit fund was not a compelling
state interest, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the denial of
unemployment benefits violated the first amendment of the United
States Constitution.11
8
The Supreme Court of the United Stated granted certiorari and
consolidated the cases.119 The Court found that the state interest
behind a criminal statute prohibiting peyote would be relevant in
determining whether the first amendment prohibits denial of
unemployment compensation to an employee who is discharged for
religiously motivated conduct that is criminal under state law. 20
The Court distinguished Sherbert, 12  Thomas, 22  and
Hobbien 3 because those exemptions from the denial of
116. Black v. Employment Div, 301 Or. 221,721 P.2d 451 (1986); Smith v. Employment Div,
301 Or. 209; 721 P.2d 445 (1986). The Oregon Supreme Court found that the issues remanded were
not disputed by the parties. Black, 301 Or. 221, 225, 721 P.2d 451, 453.
117. Smith v. Employment Div., 301 Or. 209,220,721 P.2d 445,450. The court reasoned that
the purpose of the criminal prohibition was irrelevant because the claimants had not been convicted,
or even charged criminally for peyote use. Id. By considering the state interest of health and safety
through use of criminal prohibition of drugs, the state interest becomes more compelling than when
simply justifying the burden by the purpose of the unemployment compensation statute. However,
recognizing the relevance of the criminal sanction in addition to the unemployment statute also
renders the burden on the individual's practice of religion more significant.
118. Id. at 217-19, 721 P.2d at 449-51. The Oregon Supreme court found the Smith case
indistinguishable from Sherbert and therefore granted the claimants an exemption. Id.
119. Employment Div. v. Smith; Employment Div. v. Black, 480 U.S. 916 (1987) (grant of
certiorari).
120. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 671
(1986) [hereinafter Smith 1].
121. See supra notes 50-66 and accompanying text (discussing Sherbert v. Verner).
122. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (discussing Thomas v. Review Board).
123. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 137 (1987)
(involving a Seventh Day Adventist woman who was denied unemployment benefits after being fired
from her job after refusing to work on her Saturday Sabbath). The Court followed Sherbert and held
that the governmental interest in preserving the stability of the unemployment benefit fund was not
a sufficiently compelling interest to justify the burden, and thereby granted Hobbie an exemption. Id.
at 148.
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unemployment benefits were for legal, legitimate conduct, whereas
in the Smith case, the conduct may have been illegal."2 The
Court found the distinction between the respondents' possible
criminal conduct in Smith and the legal conduct in Sherbert to be
critical, and remanded the case to the Oregon Supreme Court to
determine if Oregon law prohibited religious use of peyote." s
The Court reasoned that if religious use of peyote was a criminal
offense in Oregon, and if the free exercise clause did not
constitutionally compel an exemption, the state was free to deny
unemployment benefits to individuals who were terminated for
engaging in that criminal conduct.126
Even though the Oregon Supreme Court determined that
Oregon statutes did not provide a legislative exemption for
religious peyote use, that court held on remand that the first
amendment prohibited statutes that criminalized religious peyote
use.' 27 The court's reasoning was based in part on finding a
significant burden on the respondents due to the long tradition of
peyote use in the Native American Church.2 8 The court was also
persuaded by the fact that Congress had established a federal
exemption for religious peyote use. 12  Again, the Supreme Court
of the United States granted certiorari. 3 °
124. Smith I, 485 U.S. at 671. It was unclear from the pleadings and the arguments whether
Oregon prohibited religious use of peyote, because the respondents were seeking an exemption from
the denial of unemployment benefits, not an exemption from the criminal statute, since the
respondents were not charged criminally. Thus, the criminality of the conduct was not at issue before
the Supreme Court in Smith L
125. Id. at 672.
126. Id. at 670.
127. Smith v. Employment Div., 307 Or. 68, 72-76, 763 P.2d 146, 148-50 (1988).
128. Id. The Oregon court extensively relied on the judicial exemption for religiously motivated
peyote use by California in People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716,394 P.2d 813,40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
See supra notes 221-231 and accompanying text (discussing People v. Woody).
129. See 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988) (American Indian Religious Freedom Act); 21 C.F.R §
1307.31 (1990) (stating -[a]lthough acts of Congress prohibit the use of peyote as a hallucinogen,
it is established federal law that peyote is constitutionally protected when used by a bona fide religion
as a sacrament").
130. Employment Division v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1598 (1990).
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B. The Majority Opinion
In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court of
the United States, reversing the Oregon Supreme Court, found that
the denial of unemployment benefits to the respondents did not
violate the free exercise clause."' Having found that Oregon state
law did not provide a religious exemption from the criminal statute
prohibiting peyote use, the Court proceeded to determine whether
the lack of a religious exemption violated the first amendment. The
Court first reviewed free exercise jurisprudence to determine what
practices were protected. 32 The Court then discussed the
applicability of strict scrutiny.3
1. Free Exercise Clause Jurisprudence
The respondents argued that the free exercise clause prohibited
the state from requiring any individual to obey a neutral law that
ds generally applied, where that law forbids the practice of a
religious act." Responding to this argument, the Court
distinguished between religious practices and religious beliefs, and
reaffirmed the traditional rule that the free exercise clause
absolutely protects religious beliefs only.35 In addition to
protection of religious beliefs, the Court recognized that the
"exercise of religion" includes the protection of religious conduct,
such as congregational worship and the use of bread and wine
during communion.136  However, the Court decided the
Constitution did not require an extension of the existing free
exercise doctrine to allow an automatic exemption for an individual
from a generally applicable law that compelled or forbade
131. Id. at 1606. Justices Rehnquist, White, Stevens and Kennedy joined Justice Scalia. Justice
O'Connor concurred, while Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun dissented.
132. Id. at 1599-1602.
133. Id. at 1602-06.
134. Id. at 1599.
135. Id.
136. Id. The Court stated that a statute which prohibited a practice only when conducted for
religious purposes "would doubtless be unconstitutional." Id.
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religiously motivated conduct. 137 Where a neutral law has the
unintended effect of burdening an individual's religious conduct,
the Court interpreted the free exercise case law as requiring an
exemption in "hybrid" cases only."3 8 A "hybrid" case is one
that alleges other constitutional protections in addition to the free
exercise clause, such as freedom of speech.139 Concluding that
the present case was not a "hybrid" because it did not implicate
free speech or, as in Yoder, parental rights, the Court held that the
respondents' case did not involve an automatic violation of the free
exercise clause."
2. Strict Scrutiny Not Applicable
The respondents' second argument was that if a constitutionally
compelled exemption could not be automatically granted, the
standard of strict scrutiny should be applied to analyze the
constitutionality of a criminal prohibition against the use of
peyote.' 4' Noting that the Court had never granted an exemption
under the strict scrutiny standard except when unemployment
benefits were denied, the Court stated it would not extend its
application to grant exemptions from neutral, generally applied
137. Id. The Court seemed to imply that an "automatic" exemption would be a statute which,
on its face, violates the free exercise clause. However, the respondents were seeking the benefit of
the application of strict scrutiny to the statute as applied to the respondents. Id. at 1610 (O'Connor,
L, concurring).
138. Id. 1601-02. The Court's analysis regarding "'hybrid" cases was new and unsubstantiated.
The Court characterized cases, such as Cantwell and Yoder, where statutes were to have violated the
free exercise clause, as involving more than one constitutional protection, thereby reasoning that more
than one constitutional protection along with religious freedom must be present to establish a free
exercise claim. Id.
139. Id. at 1601. The Court asserted that CantweU "specifically adverted" to the constitutional
freedoms of press and speech, in addition to the free exercise claim. Id. The Court also alleged that
Yoder involved the constitutional privacy right involving parenthood interests. Id. at 1601 n.l.
140. Id. 1602. However, Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, stated that the respondents were
not seeking an automatic exemption, only the benefit of the application of strict scrutiny. Id. at 1610
(O'Connor, J., concurring). See infra notes 178-187 and accompanying text (discussing the "hybrid"
distinction).
141. Smith, 110 S. Ct at 1610 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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criminal statutes. 42 The Court asserted that the presence of a
"good cause" standard in the unemployment compensation scheme
was conducive to individualized state assessment of the reasons for
the individual's misconduct, and enabled the Court to utilize the
strict scrutiny.1
43
The Court found strict scrutiny inapplicable to free exercise
challenges to criminal laws for three reasons. First, the Court
reasoned that the government would be unable to enforce generally
applicable criminal laws if the government were forced to quantify
the effect of every government action on the religion of its
citizens.' 44 The Court believed that preserving the state's ability
to regulate conduct harmful to society was paramount and could
not be limited by individual exemptions. 45
The Court asserted a second reason to reject strict scrutiny by
stating that applying the standard to a generally applicable statute
would be inconsistent with usage of the standard in challenges to
other provisions of the constitution, such as the equal protection
142. Id. at 1603. The Court refused to acknowledge the invalidation of the neutral, generally
applied criminal statute in Wisconsin v. Yoder. See infra notes 188-190 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's disregard of Wisconsin v. Yoder).
143. Smith, 110 S. CL at 1603. The "good cause" standard for denying unemployment benefits
created a vehicle for "individualized exemptions." Id. The Court reasoned that if state law had in
place a system for exemption, the Court could infer an intent to discriminate should the state to fail
to extend the exemption to cases involving religious hardship. Id.
144. Id. at 1603-05. Justice Scalia feared that to apply strict scrutiny would "open the prospect
of constitutionally required religious exemption from civic obligation of almost every conceivable
kind .... " Id. At this point, Justice Scalia listed cases involving free exercise claims, which Justice
O'Connor characterized as a "parade of horribles." Id. at 1605; id. at 1612-13 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice O'Connor stated that the list of cases showed that the Court could strike
".sensible balances." Id. at 1612-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring). On the other hand, Justice Scalia
insisted that the cases demonstrated that "it is horrible to contemplate that federal judges will
regularly balance against the importance of general laws the significance of the religious practice."
Id. at 1606. Some cases listed by Justice Scalia included United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)
(payment of taxes); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), (child labor statute); Susan &
Tony Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (minimum wage regulations).
Id
145. Smith, 110 S. CL at 1603. The Court relied on the conclusion in Reynolds v. United States
that requiring the individual to obey state laws which conflict with the individual's religious practices
only if the state can prove a compelling interest permits the individual "to become a law unto
himself." Id. at 1603.
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claims resulting from racial discrimination. 1" Strict scrutiny is
applied in equal protection cases where there is an intent to
discriminate on the face of the statute.147 However, to apply strict
scrutiny to the peyote prohibition, the Court would have applied the
strict scrutiny standard to a generally applicable criminal statute
which was facially neutral. 14 Thus, where applying strict scrutiny
in equal protection analyses produced equal treatment, the Court
characterized the result of its application in free exercise claims as
compelling different treatment or a "constitutional anomaly., 149
Lastly, the Court rejected the respondents' proposed application
of strict scrutiny only where the religious conduct burdened is
"central" to the individual's religion.150 The Court felt it was
prohibited by the first amendment from assessing either the
centrality of a religious belief or practice or the significance of the
burden since this would be, in effect, judging the merits of the
religion." The Court reasoned that just as the Court was not
constitutionally allowed to determine the "importance" of ideas in
free speech cases, it was not appropriate for the judiciary to trigger
review of laws under the strict scrutiny standard by the
determination of the "centrality" of the practice to the individual's
religion.152
Based on these three reasons, the Court reversed the Oregon
Supreme Court and held that because the criminal prohibition
against peyote was constitutional, the denial of the respondents'
unemployment benefits was not a violation of the first amendment
free exercise clause.55 The Court found that the state legislature
could constitutionally exempt religiously motivated peyote use from
146. Id. at 1604. Justice Scalia asserted that the different usage of strict scrutiny in free exercise
cases could dilute the standard's stringent application in other constitutional areas. Id. at 1605.
147. Id. at 1604 n.3 (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)).
148. Id.
149. Id. In concurrence, Justice O'Connor rejected the majority's argument that free exercise
claims produced a "'constitutional anomaly," because an individual's free exercise of religion is the
"preferred constitutional activity" and thus a "'constitutional norm." Id. at 1612 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
150. Id. at 1604.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1606.
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its criminal prohibitions, but that the constitution did not require
such an exemption.15 4 In effect, the Court left the task of creating
religious exemptions to the legislature. 155 In doing so, the Court
realized that minority, nontraditional religions might be
disadvantaged since these groups historically do not have much
access to the political process and therefore lack the ability to
influence legislation.15 6 However, the Court felt that this result




Smith constitutes part of a trend of the Supreme Court to
diminish constitutional protections while emphasizing the
availability of redress through legislative remedies. By refusing to
apply strict scrutiny, the Court held that any uniformly applied
criminal prohibition may be enforced against any individual,
regardless of the extreme burden on a particular religion, so long
as this burden on religion is not the government's intention in
enacting the statute. However, the Court maintained that it will
continue the application of strict scrutiny in the limited cases
involving direct regulation of religious beliefs or conduct, hybrid
circumstances and unemployment compensation.
C. The Concurring Opinion
Justice O'Connor, joined in part by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun, concurred, disagreeing with the rejection of review
under the strict scrutiny standard.15 1 Justice O'Connor agreed
with the majority's conclusion that the criminal prohibition was
constitutional, however, she did not agree with the holding that free




157. Id. However, disfavoring minority religions is not an unavoidable consequence of
democracy, as Justice O'Connor pointed out in the concurrence, because accommodating minority
views is exactly what the first amendment was enacted to protect. Id. at 1613 (O'Connor, I.,
concurring).
158. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in Parts I and H of Justice O'Connor's
opinion, but did not concur in the result. Id. at 1606 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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laws.159 Instead, Justice O'Connor asserted that the constitution
requires a more expansive free exercise protection of religious
practices.' 60 Justice O'Connor, along with the three other justices,
argued that strict scrutiny should be applied to a generally
applicable law that burdens an individual's free exercise of
religion." Justice O'Connor rejected the characterization of free
exercise cases by the majority as "hybrid" since she felt the cases
relied solely on the free exercise clause. 62 In Justice O'Connor's
opinion, the application of strict scrutiny would be made on a case-
by-case basis to determine if the burden was significant, whether
the state interest was compelling, and whether the state could show
that uniform application of the law was the least restrictive
alternative available to accomplish the compelling state
interest. 6
3
IReaffirming the vitality of the strict scrutiny standard in free
exercise cases, Justice O'Connor applied the strict scrutiny
standard, since a criminal prohibition of peyote use significantly
burdened a sincere religious practice by forcing the respondents to
forsake their religious practices or risk criminal prosecution.'
Advocating the shifting of the burden to the state to demonstrate
a compelling state interest justifying the burden on the individual's
practice of religion, Justice O'Connor, in a portion of her
159. Id. at 1607 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor felt that the majority gave a
"strained reading" of the free exercise jurisprudence. Id. Making the religious conduct criminal
forces the individual to choose in the "severest" manner possible. Id. at 1610 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Also, given the wide range of conduct that the legislature could criminalize, Justice
O'Connor stated that it was not prudent to presume that an exemption from a criminal statute would
never be constitutionally compelled. Id. at 1611 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 1607 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
161. Id. at 1608 (O'Connor, L, concurring). Justice O'Connor asserted that a neutral law could
also burden an individuars free exercise of religion. Id. Further, the first amendment made no
distinction between neutral laws and those specifically directed at religion. Id. Also, Justice O'Connor
recognized that a general law is the most common scenario in a free exercise claim, because a
legislature is not likely to be so unsophisticated as to enact a direct prohibition, specifically targeting
a religious practice. Id.
162. Id. at 1609 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor asserted that the Court's prior
cases, such as Wisconsin v. Yoder, did not turn on the presence of other constitutional protections in
addition to the free exercise protection. Id.
163. Id. 1611 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 1613 (O'Connor, ., concurring). Justice O'Connor determined that a criminal statute
constitutes a sufficient burden to trigger strict scrutiny. Id.
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concurrence joined by no other justices, reasoned that the state had
a compelling state interest in controlling illegal substances in order
to promote public health, safety, and welfare.16 5 Justice O'Connor
found the state interest to be compelling because of the seriousness
of the drug abuse problem to society." Further, Justice
O'Connor felt that uniform application of the criminal law was
essential to the compelling state interest because of the health
effects of drug use and the societal interest in preventing drug
trafficking.167 Granting an exemption to the respondents would
greatly inhibit the state's ability to achieve these state goals.16
Therefore, Justice O'Connor held that the respondents' free
exercise rights were not violated under the strict scrutiny
standard. 169
D. The Dissenting Opinion
Although Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, dissented, the dissenters agreed with Justice O'Connor's
opinion that the application of the strict scrutiny standard was still
a vital approach to free exercise claims.17 ° However, the dissent
disagreed with Justice O'Connor's conclusion that the state's
interest was compelling and that granting the respondents an
exemption to the criminal prohibition against peyote use would
165. Id. at 1614.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1614 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus, the statute was narrowly tailored to meet the
compelling state interest.
168. Id. Justice O'Connor rejected the respondents' contention that the alleged threat to the
compelling state interest was disproved by the states which exempted religious peyote use from their
general prohibition without problems. Id. Justice O'Connor responded that the states could choose
to exempt without being constitutionally compelled to do so. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1616 (Blackmnn, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmnn characterized the Court's effort
to develop a test to determine when a statute forbidding or compelling religious conduct violated the
free exercise clause as "painstaking." Id. at 1615 (Blackmnn, J., dissenting). The dissent criticized
the majority for effectuating a "wholesale overturning of settled law concerning the Religion Clauses
of our Constitution" and expressed a hope that the result in the present case was "not a product of
overreaction to the serious problems the country's drug crisis has generated." Id. at 1616 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
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"unduly interfere" with the enforcement of the state interest. 171
In the dissenters' opinion, the relevant state interest was the interest
in refusing to allow an exemption to the law criminalizing
religiously motivated peyote use, and not the state's interest in
regulating the drug war. 72 With this narrow focus, the dissent
argued that the state could not feasibly allege that uniform
application of the criminal law to religious peyote users was
essential to a compelling state interest because the respondents had
never been criminally charged for their use of peyote. 173 Justice
Blackmun asserted that the exemption for religious peyote use in
federal criminal drug statutes, 74 the circumscribed extent of the
exemption, 175 the lack of illegal drug trafficking in peyote,176
and the benefits from religious use of peyote established that the
state interest was neither compelling nor narrowly drawn, and the
Oregon statute thus violated the free exercise clause. 177
171. Id. at 1616 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 1617 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that the state interest in
combatting the "war on drugs" was not the relevant interest, but that the interest was the narrower
state interest in rejecting the respondent's claim for exemption for religiously motivated peyote use.
Id. Citing Thomas v. Review Board, the dissent asserted that the focus of the state interest in the strict
scrutiny standard must be "properly narrowed." Id. The dissent noted that since the purpose of
almost any law could be asserted to be public health, safety, and welfare, the failure to narrow the
focus resulted in a distortion of the standard of strict scrutiny in the state's favor. Id.
173. Id. Since the state had not charged the respondents criminally, the dissent stated that the
state's argument was only "symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition." Id. at 1617
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent also pointed to the fact that the state had presented no
evidence that anyone had ever been harmed by religiously motivated peyote use. Id. at 1618
(Blackmun, 3., dissenting).
174. Id. at 1618 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See 42 U.S.C § 1996 (1988) (American Indian
Religious Freedom Act).
175. Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 1620-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent believed that because
the respondents' religious use of peyote was well restricted by the traditional rules of Indian ritual,
the peyote use was unlike the more dangerous, widespread usage of recreational drugs. Id. at 1618
(Blackinun, J., dissenting). Recreational use of peyote is considered sacrilegious by members of the
Native American Church. Id. at 1619 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Further, the dissent recognized that
recreational peyote use is "'self-limiting" due to its bitter taste which often causes nausea and
vomiting. Id. at 1619 n.7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 1620 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 1622 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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II. FEDERAL IMPLICATIONS
The Supreme Court's refusal to apply strict scrutiny in Smith
significantly narrows the constitutional protection afforded by the
free exercise clause. Specifically, the Court held that there is no
free exercise claim implicated by a generally applicable criminal
law even though the law burdens a central religious practice. In
doing so, the majority contended that the result in Smith is "in
accord" with past free exercise precedent.
In order to reach the result in Smith, the Court adopted a
"hybrid" rationale. 178 Under this analysis, strict scrutiny applies
only where the facts of the case implicate other constitutional
protections, such as freedom of speech, in addition to free exercise
concerns. Since the parties did not argue that the facts in Smith
implicated more than the free exercise clause, the respondents'
claim did not warrant strict scrutiny.17 9 However, the Court did
not offer any explanation or textual basis for this new hybrid
distinction."8 ° Instead, the Court construed prior free exercise case
law which recognized that free exercise claims to generally
applicable statutes involved constitutional protections in addition to
the free exercise guarantee. Yet, as Justice O'Connor recognized in
the concurrence, the cases relied upon by the majority to develop
the "hybrid" distinction, Cantwell and Yoder, "expressly relied"
on the free exercise clause and have been repeatedly cited as
benchmark cases in the development of free exercise clause
jurisprudence. "8
In fact, most free exercise cases could be found to implicate
constitutional guarantees other than religious freedom under the
free exercise clause, such as privacy rights, freedom of association,
equal protection, as well as the free speech and parental concerns
found by the majority in Cantwell and Yoder. In spite of this, the
parties in Smith did not plead or argue additional constitutional
178. See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text (discussing the "hybrid" distinction).
179. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1602.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1609 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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protections because the "hybrid" distinction did not exist prior to
the resolution of Smith. The Smith case might have been
characterized as "hybrid" because of equal protection concerns
arising from religious discrimination or even racial discrimination,
given that the majority of the Native American Church members
involved in the peyote ceremonies are Indians.'82
By requiring an additional constitutional implication in a free
exercise claim, the majority devalued the independent vitality of the
free exercise clause. The majority contended that exemptions for
religious conduct are not historically or textually supported.183
Yet, the founding fathers' belief in the importance of religious
liberty is well documented."' The development of our nation was
initiated by individuals pursuing freedom from religious
intolerance." 5 Expressly recognizing the importance of protecting
the Nation's citizens from future regulation of religion, the framers
of the first amendment adopted the language "free exercise of
religion" rather than the proposed "rights of conscience," in order
to protect both religious conduct and religious beliefs.'86
Moreover, Justice O'Connor stated that the constitutional text
182. See The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L REV. 129, 202-06
(1990) (discussing the equal protection component of Smith). Yet, Justice O'Connor stated that the
Court had previously recognized that the free exercise protection is independent of the protection
found under the equal protection clause. Smith, 110 S. CL at 1612 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1987)).
183. Smith, 110 S. CL at 1599.
184. 110 S.Ct. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor asserted that the founding
fathers created a form of government which "envisaged the widest possible toleration of conflicting
views." Id. (citing United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944)).
185. See generally McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of the Free Exercise
of Religion, 103 HFIv. L REv. 1409 (1990) (discussing historical development behind development
of the free exercise clause).
186. See i. at 1488-1503 (advocating that the free exercise clause was specifically intended
by the framers to grant exemptions for religiously motivated conduct). Early state constitutions, prior
to adoption of the Bill of Rights, provided generous protection of religious liberty. Id. at 1459. The
framers utilized the language in the state constitutions to draft the text of the first amendment. Id.
Dictionaries of the day defined "exercise" as "action" which indicates that usage of the words "free
exercise" contemplated protection of opinions, as well as practices. Id. at 1489. McConnell contends
that while this evidence of the framers' intent is not conclusive, it is sufficient to shift burden to the
state to prove that the first amendment prohibits exemptions. Id. at 1513.
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expressly indicates that religious freedom is a "preferred
constitutional activity."' 87
Another limit on the free exercise doctrine is the confinement
of strict scrutiny to the unemployment context of Sherbert, Thomas,
and Hobbie.188 Again, the Court construed free exercise case law
and determined that the Court had never declared any statute
unconstitutional after applying strict scrutiny except in the
unemployment context."8 9 However, the Court completely ignored
Yoder, wherein the Court applied strict scrutiny to invalidate a
compulsory high school attendance law, a case which clearly did
not involve the denial of unemployment benefits.'9° The Court
attempted to distinguish the cases where strict scrutiny was applied
outside the employment context to a statute found constitutional by
stating that in these cases the Court had only "purported" to
employ strict scrutiny. 91
Just as the development of the "hybrid" distinction was left
unexplained, the Court likewise neglected to demonstrate why the
application of heightened review under the strict scrutiny standard
was not appropriate to non-unemployment scenarios. To support the
Court's contention that strict scrutiny had not been applied outside
the field of unemployment, the Court cited to the Goldman and
O'Lone cases which, as previously discussed, involved special
situations that did not warrant the application of strict
187. Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 1612 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The provision for religious liberty
is the first freedom listed in the fist amendment. U.S. CoNsT. amend. L
188. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
189. Id. at 1602. The Court referred to Sherbert v. Verner, Thomas v. Review Board, and
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida in support of this premise. Id.
190. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text (discussing Wisconsin v. Yoder).
191. Id. at 1602 (citing United State v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)). The Court did not explain
what it means to "'purport" to apply a standard of review to government action. In Lee, the
individual was denied an exemption to a social security law because the state proved a compelling
state interest was achieved by the least restrictive alternative. See supra notes 81-87 and
accompanying text (discussing United States v. Lee). Therefore, where a statute survives review under
the strict scrutiny standard, perhaps the Court has only 'purported" to apply the standard.
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scrutiny. "Therefore, these cases did not support the Court's
reasoning.
Another unsettling issue in the restriction of strict scrutiny to
unemployment cases is the Court's focus on the "good cause"
standard within the unemployment statutory scheme, which
included particularized hearings to determine the "cause" of the
employee's termination. 3 As previously explained, the "good
cause" standard provided a system of exemptions under the
unemployment laws where an employee would be eligible for
benefits if not terminated for "good cause.""9 4 The Court
asserted that adoption of the strict scrutiny standard in the
unemployment context was due to this "distinctive feature" of
providing a mechanism for individualized fact finding for
discovering the reason for the terminated individual's conduct. 9
Yet, the Court did not explain the constitutional significance of
"individual assessment" or discuss why trial courts are unable to
conduct their own assessment of the facts. After all, a major role
of the court is to make factual determinations and review the
constitutionality of fact records. Therefore, the "good cause"
standard does not seem to be an adequate rationale for restricting
the application of strict scrutiny.
As the dissent discussed, the Smith case arose within the
context of a denial of unemployment benefits, similar to
Sherbert.' The Court distinguished the denial of benefits in
192. The Goldman v. Weinberger case involved an orthodox Jew's free exercise challenge to
a military regulation requiring uniform dress which forbade him to wear his yarmulke. See supra
notes 100-101 and accompanying text (discussing Goldman v. Weinberger). O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz involved an Islamic prisoner's free exercise challenge to a prison regulation prohibiting him
from participating in his sacred religious ceremony, Jumu'ah. See supra notes 100-101 and
accompanying text (discussing OLone v. Estate of Shabazz).
193. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of the "good cause"
standard).
194. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing the "'good cause" standard).
195. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
196. Id. at 1616 n.2 (Blackmun, 3., dissenting). The dissent asserted that the respondents were
refused benefits because their peyote use was "misconduct" and not because they had been
convicted, or even charged with a criminal violation. Id. However, the dissent later conceded that the
case was properly before the Court because of the first Court decision to remand to the Oregon
Supreme Court to determine the criminality of the respondent's conduct. Id.
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Smith from the denial in Sherbert on the ground that the strict
scrutiny standard only applied to legal misconduct, whereas the use
of peyote in Smith was illegal.1 97 This represents a further
restriction on the application of strict scrutiny, since strict scrutiny
can now only apply to cases where the misconduct is not
criminalized by a generally applicable statute.
The Court's reasoning implies that choosing between a denial
of a state civil benefit and a violation of an individual's religion
imposes a greater burden on the free exercise of religion, and thus
requires more judicial scrutiny, than choosing between criminal
prosecution or that same violation of religion.19 To the contrary,
the cases prior to Smith had indicated that criminal prohibitions
constituted a greater burden on religion and thus should be given
increased judicial scrutiny, rather than the automatic denial of
review given by the Court in Smith.199 However, the Court's
reasoning could imply that the state's interest in enforcing a neutral
prohibition of criminal conduct is stronger than the state's interest
in the unemployment cases where the individual was acting legally.
Yet as Justice O'Connor concluded, the degree of the state's
interest would have been given great weight in the determination
of whether the interest was "compelling" under the strict scrutiny
standard.
In restricting the applicability of strict scrutiny in Smith, the
Court leaves generally applicable laws with little, if any, judicial
review. Justice O'Connor, in concurrence, disagreed with the
majority's refusal to apply strict scrutiny to the generally applicable
criminal statute, arguing that there was no textual distinction in the
first amendment between generally applicable criminal laws and
those laws which are specifically intended to burden a religious
197. Id. at 1603.
198. Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 1600. The Court ignored the Yoder case which granted an exemption
from a generally applicable criminal law even though the state interest in Yoder ranked "at the very
apex of the function of the state." See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text (discussing
Wisconsin v. Yoder).
199. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986). See supra notes 88-99 and accompanying text
(discussing Bowen v. Roy).
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group or practice.20° Justice O'Connor felt the Court was
"naive" to believe that state legislatures would not couch their
discriminatory or burdensome legislation in generally applicable
statutes, rather than enacting a facially unconstitutional statute."'
Given the Court's result-oriented interpretation of
precedent,2  it is foreseeable that Smith could be extended from
insulating generally applicable criminal statutes from free exercise
challenges to generally applicable civil statutes in a factually
appropriate case. Civil penalties can be very similar to criminal
penalties because they both can involve monetary fines and
imprisonment through contempt proceedings. Also, civil statutes,
like criminal statutes, are increasingly employed to regulate socially
harmful conduct.2 3  Therefore, in a case involving a
nontraditional religion and socially questionable conduct, such as
drug usage, the Court is likely to extend Smith to generally
applicable civil statutes.
Considering the power of legislatures to criminalize conduct,
there could be a substantial impact on the practices of other
traditional religions. For example, a generally applicable state or
county prohibition on alcohol could implicate the communion
services of Catholics. Also, laws protecting animals could terminate
the ritualized killing required to produce Kosher products for the
Jewish community, as well as the feasibility of medical regulations
impeding the circumcision of male babies. Clearly, Smith could
have a far-reaching impact on the practices of many religions.2°
200. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1608 (O'Connor, L., concurring).
201. Id.
202. See supra notes 188-190 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's disregard of
Wisconsin v. Yoder).
203. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1988) (civil penalties for violation of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988) (civil penalties for violations of the Clean Water Act); 42
U.S.C. §§ 6927-6928 (1988) (civil penalties for violation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act).
204. Justice Blackmun, in dissent, acknowledged the practical effect of the decision in a
footnote. Smith, 110 S. Ct at 1618 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent discussed the effect
of prohibition on Catholics and noted that during that period Congress had provided an exemption
from prohibition for the use of wine during communion. Id.
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It is evident that Smith has profoundly influenced free exercise
clause jurisprudence.2'5  The application of strict scrutiny is
reserved for cases which involve the denial of unemployment
benefits for legal conduct or statutes which directly regulate
religious beliefs or conduct. In order to qualify for strict scrutiny
of a generally applicable law, the claim must be "hybrid.'"
Furthermore, the precedential value of Yoder is minimal due to the
disregard of the decision by the Court in Smith. °6
Beginning with United States v. Lee, 07 the result in Smith has
been foreshadowed. One reason for the result in Smith may have
been, as the dissent speculated, a reaction to the drug crisis. Yet,
the Smith holding has since been applied in non-drug related cases,
and thus it is apparent that Smith will not be confined to its facts,
as Sherbert was confined in Smith.208
Perhaps the lack of judicial protection of religious liberty is a
result of discrimination against nonmainstream religions. The
majority characterized this discrimination as an "unavoidable
consequence of democratic government."'2 9 It is curious that in
cases which involved nonmainstream religions, the Court has
consistently denied the free exercise claims.2 0 Arguably, the land
205. See Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d. 46,48 (7th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that the Smith Court
restricted free exercise exemptions "possibly to minute dimensions"); Salaam v. Lockhart, 905 F.2d.
1168, 1171 n.7 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting in case challenging constitutionality of a prison regulations
that Smith did not affect prisoner's free exercise rights, but instead brought "'the free exercise rights
of private citizens closer to those of prisoners").
206. See supra notes 188-190 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's disregard of
Wisconsin v. Yoder when looking at the application of strict scrutiny in a non-unemployment context
and to a generally applicable criminal statute).
207. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Lee and the
Court's compulsion approach).
208. See, e.g., State v. Hershberger, 110 S. CL 1918 (1990) (vacating and remanding a case
involving an Amish defendant's violation of a criminal statute requiring slow moving vehicles display
a safety sign for reconsideration under the Smith decision); Intercommunity Center for Justice and
Peace v. I.N.S., 910 F.2d 42 (2nd Cir. 1990) (applying Smith to deny an exemption from the
Immigration and Reform and Control Act).
209. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1606 (1990). See generally Lupa, supra note
17, at 933 (proposing a common law test to determine whether a state action burdens an individual's
religious freedom, in order to protect against discrimination against nonmainstrearn religions).
210. See L TRiBE, AMERIcAN CON STrrtoNAL LAW 1271 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the result
in Reynolds denying a Mormon an exemption from polygamy law as an example of how "amorphous
goals may serve to mask religious persecution"); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
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in the Lyng case was as essential to the Indians' religion as home
education to the Amish in the Yoder case and Sabbath observance
to the Seventh-Day Adventists in Sherbert and Hobbe. u
Reasonable persons could find the burden on the practice of
religion in Lyng more substantial than the burden in Yoder,
Sherbert, and Hobbie.212 As Justice Brennan noted: "A critical
function of the First Amendment is to protect the rights of
members of minority religions against the quiet erosion by
majoritarian social institutions that dismiss minority beliefs and
practices as unimportant, because unfamiliar."
213
In contrast to such a philosophy, Justice Scalia in Smith left
religious accommodation to the political process. Congressional
members introduced the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1990 as legislative response to the Supreme Court's ruling in
Smith.214  The legislation requires a governmental authority
2 15
to prove that any law216 restricting an individual's free exercise
of religion is generally applicable and does not intentionally
discriminate against or among religions.2 7 The government must
also prove that the application of the law is the least restrictive
Assn., 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (rejecting free exercise claim by Native American Indians for exemption
from governmental action which destroyed nearly all of the Indians' sacred religious grounds);
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (rejecting Islamic prisoner's claim for exemption
from prison regulation); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (denying Native American Indian an
exemption from welfare law).
211. See The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 51, at 241 (advocating
that Lyng was not given the "same constitutional respect" that traditional religions are conferred).
See also Note, supra note 107, at 410-22 (criticizing the result in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association).
212. Compare Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439,453 (1988)
(acknowledging the burden on the Indians' religion rendered the practice of their religion
"impossible") with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (characterizing Sherbert's burden
as similar to a "penalty").
213. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 524 (1986) (Brennan, ., dissenting).
214. H.R. 377, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) was introduced into Congress on July 26, 1990
by Representative Solarz. As of publication date of this Note, the Act has not yet been reintroduced.
215. See id. § 4(1) (definition of governmental authority includes federal, state, and municipal
authorities).
216. See id. § 5(a) (stating that act applies to all federal and state laws, regulations, and
administrative orders both previously and subsequently enacted).
217. Id. § 2(b)(1).
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means of achieving a compelling governmental interest."" The
Act requires the courts to engage in a case-by-case determination
of the state's interest in restricting an individual's religious
practices.
The bill subjects laws to review under strict scrutiny even
where the law is generally applicable and does not intentionally
discriminate on its face. Under this bill, strict scrutiny would have
been applied to the statute criminalizing peyote in Smith because
the statute was generally applicable without any facially
discriminatory intent. Yet, the result in Smith would not have
changed, given the severity of the state interest in uniform
enforcement of drug laws. A probable analysis under this Act
would be similar to Justice O'Connor's reasoning that the state
interest in Smith was indeed the least restrictive means of achieving
a compelling state interest. Thus, in either instance, the respondents
would not have been granted an exemption.
The protection of religious liberty provided by the Act would
expand free exercise freedom, even prior to the Smith decision,
because the Act does not require individuals to establish a
significant burden before the state must prove a compelling state
interest, as was traditionally necessary. 19 Even more, the Act
appears to apply the strict scrutiny standard to all neutral statutes,
including military and prison regulations, which previously only
required a rational basis. Thus, even though the Smith Court
delegated the task of religious accommodation to the
legislature,220 with the enactment of this Act, the responsibility
would return to the courts.
218. Id. § 2(b)(2). This section requires application of strict scrutiny. Id. A civil action is
provided for individuals whose rights have been violated under the Act. Id. § 2(c).
219. See infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text (discussing the individual's initial burden
under the strict scrutiny standard in Sherbert).
220. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1606 (1990). Justice Scalia left religious
accommodation to the political process. Id.
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IV. LEGAL IMPLICAnONS IN CALIFORNIA
In 1964, California created an exemption for religious use of
peyote. This exemption, developed in People v. Woody,," was
explicitly based on the California Supreme Court's interpretation
of the first amendment of the United States Constitution as it
applied to a generally applicable statute prohibiting possession of
peyote.' 2 In Woody, the Indian defendants were arrested for
possession of peyote while engaging in a religious ceremony in the
desert.2' The defendants entered a plea of not guilty, asserting
that the free exercise clause compelled an exemption to the
criminal statute because their use of peyote was in accordance with
their religion.24 The court found that Sherbert was controlling
precedent and applied strict scrutiny.'
The court discussed the long history of peyotism and its central
role in the religious practices of the Native American Church in
order to find a significant burden on the defendants' practice of
religion.' 6 Since the application of the criminal statute resulted
in a "virtual inhibition" of the defendants' religious practice, the
court found that the defendants had established a significant burden
on their practice of religion.2 7 The prosecutor attempted to
satisfy the state's burden of proving that the statute was narrowly
tailored to meet a compelling state interest, by arguing that peyote
had a detrimental effect on Indian society, and that the concern for
fraudulent claims from religious exemptions would result in the
221. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). The Oregon Supreme Court in
Smith relied in part on the Woody case in granting an exemption for respondents. See supra notes
127-129 and accompanying text (discussing Oregon Supreme Court's treatment of Smith).
222. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 717, 394 P.2d at 815, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
223. Id. Woody differs from Smith since the respondents in Smith were never charged under
the criminal statute prohibiting peyote usage.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 718-19, 394 P.2d at 815, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
226. Id. at 720, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73. The court required that the defendants'
religious belief in peyotism was bona fide. Id. at 726-27,394 P.2d at 823,40 Cal. Rptr. at 76-77. The
court stated that peyote was more important to the Indians' religion than the use of sacramental wine
during Catholic communion services because the peyote was "in itself an object of worshlip." Id. at
721, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
227. Id. at 722. 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74. The court stated that not to grant an
exemption would "remove the theological heart" of the defendants' religion. Id.
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state's inability to enforce its drug laws.228 The court rejected
these arguments because there was no actual evidence of
detrimental effect and, in fact, the evidence tended to show that a
beneficial effect resulted from religious peyote use. 9 Likewise,
the court also refused to accept the assertion of the state's inability
to enforce the drug laws, due to the fact that other states had
exempted religious peyote use without evidence of impairment of
drug enforcement." Thus, the court held that the first
amendment protection of the defendants' religious freedom
outweighed the state's minimal interest in the unsubstantiated
danger to drug enforcement. Therefore, the criminal statute, as
applied to the defendants, violated the free exercise clause.231
Even though Woody has been law in California for twenty-six
years, the case did not result in a flood of claims for exemption
from every drug user seeking a defense to criminal prosecution, an
assertion underlying the Court's decision in Smith.232 In fact,
since Woody, the California Supreme Court has not been faced with
a single case of fraudulent use of peyote. However, given that the
exemption in Woody was explicitly based on the Federal
Constitution, the validity of Woody is in doubt after Smith,
33
unless the California courts interpret the California Constitution as
compelling an exemption.2
The Court in Smith recognized that a religious exemption from
a criminal statute may be compelled under the Oregon
Constitution." This may be possible because state constitutions
may provide greater, but not lesser, protection for individuals
228. Id. at 722-23, 394 P.2d at 819-20, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74-75. The court recognized that the
same concerns of fraudulent claims had been raised and rejected in Sherbert due to the alternative
means available to protect against abuses. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 723, 394 P.2d at 819, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
231. Id. at 717, 394 P.2d at 815, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
232. Employment Div. v. Smith. I10 S. CL 1595, 1620 n.8 (1990) (Blackmun, L, dissenting).
233. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (determining that the supremacy clause of
the United States Constitution renders Supreme Court opinions the "supreme law of the land").
234. See generally Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (discussing the ability of state
courts to offer greater protection of constitutional rights under analogous state constitutional
provisions, and discussing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review such determinations).
235. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1607.
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against state action than the Federal Constitution. Similarly, the
California Constitution may also compel an exemption for religious
use of peyote.
It is beyond the reach of this Note to examine the scope of the
California Constitution's protection of religious conduct. Briefly
speaking, the California Constitution provides that "[f]ree exercise
and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference are
guaranteed." 6  The California provision is textually
distinguishable from the first amendment because the California
Constitution forbids discrimination and preference of religion.237
In contrast, the first amendment to the United States Constitution
only excludes prohibition of the free exercise of religion.238
Arguably, the California Constitution offers more protection than
its federal analog."" Yet, even without a textual distinction,
California courts are free to interpret the California Constitution as
requiring an exemption even though an exemption would not be
similarly required under the first amendment of the United States
Constitution.
Due to the restriction of religious freedom under the Federal
Constitution after Smith, California courts will increasingly be
confronted with claims for religious exemption under the California
Constitution. In 1969, one California appellate court construed the
provision to require application of strict scrutiny to laws prohibiting
religiously motivated conduct.24 However, it is unclear how the
current California courts will interpret the protection provided by
the California Constitution.
236. CAL CONST. art. 1, § 4.
237. Id.
238. Compare id. with U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
239. See Crosby, New Frontiers: Individual Rights Under the California Constitution, 17
HASTINOS CONST. LQ. 81, 88-89 (1989) (asserting that the California Constitution's protection of
religious freedom is "'clearly more expansive" than the protection offered by the first amendment).
240. People v. Collins, 273 Cal. App. 2d 486, 488, 78 Cal. Rptr, 151, 152 (1969) (denying
religious exemption from criminal prohibition of marijuana).
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, in Employment Division v. Smith,-restricted
the protection offered by the free exercise clause, thereby rendering
the future of the constitutionally compelled free exercise exemption
in doubt. Hence, individuals will be forced to seek redress from
state courts under state constitutions or from lobbying legislatures
for statutory exemptions. In either case, the final result is that first
amendment protection of an individual's religious conduct against
state intrusion is diminished.
Virginia C. Magan
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